Salt Lake City, a Municipal Corporation v. Paul B. Manwaring : Brief of Respondent Salt Lake City by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Salt Lake City, a Municipal Corporation v. Paul B.
Manwaring : Brief of Respondent Salt Lake City
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger F. Cutler; Salt Lake City Attorney; Cheryl D. Luke; City Prosecutor; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Charles F. Loyd, Jr.; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Salt Lake City, a Municipal Corporation v. Paul B. Manwaring: Brief of Respondent Salt Lake City, No. 880643 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1425








smmi IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
" STATE OF UTAH 




PAUL B. MANWARING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880643-CA 
Appeal Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY 
Appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer, 
presiding. 
ROGER F. CUTLER, 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
CHERYL D. LUKE, 
City Prosecutor, 
451 South 200 East, Suite 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7767 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR., 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorney for Appellant 
F I L E D 
AUG 2 31989 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 




PAUL B. MANWARING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880643-CA 
Appeal Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY 
Appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer, 
presiding. 
ROGER F. CUTLER, 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
CHERYL D. LUKE, 
City Prosecutor, 
451 South 200 East, Suite 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7767 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR., 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I; 
MANWARING, BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE 
VIOLATED SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 11-04-100 BY 
CONCEALING HIS IDENTITY 5 
POINT II: 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AN INVESTIGATORY "TERRY" 
STOP AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
THE DEFENDANT 6 
POINT III: 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
LAWFULLY HAVE TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION UNDER KOELENDER 
V. LAWSON IS MISPLACED 7 
POINT IV: 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF GUILTY IS NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE 9 
CONCLUSION 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US 352 (1982) 2,3,7,8 
State v. Sierra, 754 P2d 972 977 (Utah app. 1988) 7 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App 1982) 6 
State v. Walker, 743 P2d 191 (Utah 1987) 9 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968 ) 6 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 6-12-130 Salt Lake City Ordinance 7 
Section 11-04-100 Salt Lake City Ordinance 1,2,3,5,10 
Section 12-2-060 Salt Lake City Ordinance 7 
Section 68-3-2 Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended) 6 
Section 68-3-11 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 6 
Section 77-35-26 (2)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 1 
Section 77-35-26(g) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 9 
Section 78-21-3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 1 
Utah Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 52a 9 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a ) 
Municipal Corporation, ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
) SALT LAKE CITY 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
) Case No. 880643-CA 
vs. ) 
) Appeal Priority 2 
PAUL B. MANWARING, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION AND 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) (1953, as amended) and Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953, as amended). This 
is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of a Class B 
Misdemeanor by the Third Circuit Court tried to the bench without 
a jury by the Honorable Judge Phillip K. Palmer, Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the 
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for 
Concealing Identity by failing to provide information about his 
identity as requested by a Salt Lake City Police officer, a Class 
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 11-04-100 of the Salt Lake 
Code (1988). The defendant/appellant, represented by his 
attorney of record, Charles F. Loyd, Jr., was found guilty after 
a bench trial. The court sentenced the defendant to two days 
jail and fines and fees of $50.00, with the two days jail 
suspended upon payment of the fines and fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 prohibiting any 
person from concealing or attempting to conceal his or her 
identity from a police officer encompass as a violation 
defendant's refusal to provide identification to police officers 
when requested? 
2. Is Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 unconstitutional 
and thereby unenforceable under the U.S. Supreme Court's holding 
in Kolender v. Lawson 461 US 352 (1982). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 11-04-100 Salt Lake City Ordinances. 
CONCEALING IDENTITY OR FURNISHING FALSE INFORMATION 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally 
conceal or attempt to conceal is or her identity, falsely 
identify himself or herself, or furnish or give false or 
misleading information to any person charged with 
enforcement of city ordinances, including but not limited to 
the following: 
A. Any police officer of the city corporation; 
B. An employee of the city fire department; 
C. An employee of the city-county health department 
enforcing the city health ordinances; 
D. Parking enforcement officers; 
E. City licensing personnel; 
F. Zoning enforcement officers; 
G. Planning officials; and/or 
H. Building officials. 
Section 77-7-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
BY PEACE OFFICERS 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
1. For any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" 
includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of 
any physical sense, or records the observations of 
any of the physical senses; 
2. When he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to 
believe that the person arrested has committed it; 
3. When he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is 
reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I. Salt Lake City ordinance 11-04-100 was violated 
when the defendant refused to provide identifying information 
when he was requested to do so by a Salt Lake City officer. This 
failure constituted the offense of concealing identity as defined 
in the ordinance. 
POINT II. Defendant's young appearance, intoxicated 
condition and possession of alcohol constituted facts sufficient 
to give rise to reasonable suspicion for the officer to make a 
"Terry" stop and constituted probable cause for an arrest. 
POINT III. Salt Lake Ordinance 11-04-100 is not 
unconstitutionally vague under Kolender v. Lawson, because it 
does not leave open for the officer? s discretion what 
constitutes "reasonable and proper" identification. It only 
requires that the defendant produce some information as to his 
identity. 
The defendant, by not providing information about his 
identity, did not place into issue what would constitute proper 
or improper information to determine identity. 
POINT IV. The verdict of the trial court is substantiated 
by the evidence and the law. Clear error does not exist to 
warrant a reversal of the conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 7, 1988 at 12:50 a.m., Officers Aiken and 
Herburg of the Salt Lake Police Department were dispatched to 466 
First Avenue on a loud party or disturbance call. (R. 17, 
Transcript P.1) 
2. Upon arrival, Officer Aiken determined that a loud 
party was in progress. Officers Aiken and Herburg contacted the 
host of the party. While talking to the host, the defendant 
stepped up and interrupted the conversation. (R. 17, Transcript 
P.2). 
3. Officer Aiken observed the defendant to be carrying a 
mug of beer and appeared to be under the age of 21. (R.17, 
Transcript P.2-3). The defendant was intoxicated. (R.17, 
Transcript P.5-6). 
4. Based on these observations, Officer Aiken inquired if 
the defendant had an I.D. The defendant responded with a "ya". 
(R.17, Transcript P.3). 
5. Officer Aiken asked the defendant to produce his I.D. 
The defendant responded with "I don't think so". (R.17, 
Transcript P.3). Officer Aiken requested the identification a 
second time and the defendant again responded with "No, I don't 
think so". He then turned towards the door and started to go 
back inside the house. (R.17, Transcript P.3-4). 
6. Officer Aiken arrested the defendant and transported 
him to the jail. At the jail the defendant was found to be in 
possession of a valid driver's license. 
POINT I. 
MANWARING, BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE 
VIOLATED SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 11-04-100 BY 
CONCEALING HIS IDENTITY. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 reads in pertinent part: 
11-04-100 CONCEALING IDENTITY OR FURNISHING FALSE INFORMATION. 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally conceal or attempt to conceal his or her 
identity, falsely identify himself or herself, or furnish or 
give false or misleading information to any person charged 
with enforcement of city ordinances, including but not 
limited to the following: 
A. Any police officer of the city corporation;... 
The defendant violated this ordinance by willfully failing 
to identify himself at the officers lawful request . The 
defendant argues that to violate the terms of the ordinance he 
must verbally provide false information to the police officer. 
Defendant supports this argument reasoning that to conceal one's 
identity requires an "affirmative act". The affirmative act 
supposedly being the verbal conversation. 
The defendant's argument is misplaced for the following 
reasons: First, the ordinance makes it unlawful to conceal one's 
identity. This requirement is satisfied by defendant's refusing 
to provide a driver's license or another form of identity, 
including orally identifying himself. Second, the affirmative 
act the defendant engaged in was the intentional and willful 
refusal itself. Thus, it was the defendant's failure to provide 
any identification, not merely his silence which constituted the 
violation. 
Statutes and ordinances are to be liberally construed to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
The words and phrases used are to be construed according to the 
2 
context and approved usage. Applying these rules to the 
ordinance, it is clear that the ordinance makes it unlawful to 
conceal one's identity in any manner. The defendant's willful 
failure to produce identification was a concealment of his 
identity. 
POINT II. 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AN INVESTIGATORY "TERRY" 
STOP AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an 
investigatory stop is permissible, even though there is not 
3 
probable cause to make an arrest. The Utah Court of Appeals is 
4 
in accord with this standard. The determination of the 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-2. 
2 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-11. 
3
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
4
 State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Ut.App. 1987). 
presence of reasonable suspicion depends on the "Totality of the 
5 
Circumstances", In the instant case, Officer Aiken noted an 
apparently intoxicated person, who appeared to be under the age 
of 21 holding an alcoholic beverage. These facts are sufficient 
to justify a "Terry" stop to investigate whether or not probable 
cause existed for an arrest under Utah Code Annotated, Section 
77-7-2 for the offenses of Public Intoxication and Minor in 
7 
Possession of Alcohol. 
From the undisputed facts it is clear that the stop, 
detention and questioning of the defendant was within 
constitutional standards. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
LAWFULLY HAVE TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION UNDER KOELENDER 
V. LAWSON IS MISPLACED. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 
(1982) held that a California statute requiring a person to 
provide "credible and reliable" identification and to account for 
their presence when requested by a police officer under 
circumstances which would justify a "Terry" stop was 
unconstitutionally vague. This holding was based on the failure 
to clarify what the term "credible and reliable identification" 
meant. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that it was totally 
within the arresting officer's discretion to determine what was 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988). 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12-2-060 
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 6-12-130. 
credible and reliable identification and therefore, the statute 
could be readily subject to abuse. The Court Stated; 
"We conclude the statute as it has been construed is 
unconstitutionally vague within meaning of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify 
what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect 
provide "credible and reliable' identification." 
In Kolender, the appellee had been arrested on 15 occasions 
between March, 1985 and January, 1977, for violation of the 
California statute. There was no evidence established that the 
appellee had violated any other California statutes or 
ordinances. The Court indicated that it was solely in the 
discretion of the arresting officer to determine if the 
g identification produced was "credible and reliable". The Court 
concluded that the statute was "unconstitutionally vague on its 
face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to 
prescribe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in 
order to satisfy the statute". 
In Kolender, the appellee was arrested for failure to 
provide "credible and reliable" identification. Whatever 
identification the appellee provided, it was within the officers 
discretion to determine if it was credible and reliable. 
In the present case, the Salt Lake Ordinance does not 
require credible and reliable identification. It only requires 
identity. The defendant did not provide identity of any kind. 
8
 Id., at 353. 
9
 Id., at 358. 
1 0
 Id., at p.361. 
He did not even verbally identify himself to the police officer. 
Such verbal or other identification may have fully satisfied the 
officer that lie was not a minor. Had the defendant provided some 
identification, either verbal or written, the ordinance would 
have been satisfied, There is no discretioi 1 for the offi cer to 
determine what identification is needed to satisfy the Salt Lake 
Ordinance and, therefore, no risk of arbitrary enforcement. The 
ordinance simply makes it a crime to c sncea 1i one's iden ti t:y, 
precisely what the defendant did by willfully not producing a 
name or any other identification. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS OF GUILT IS NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE. 
The standard of review of an appeal is the verdict of the 
trial court shall not be set aside unless it is clearly 
erroneous,, The facts in the instant case are uncontroverted 
and clearly support a violation of Salt Lake Ordinance 11-04-100. 
The defendant did not supply the requested identification and 
thereby concealed his identity. The trial court's verdict should 
stand. 
It is a question for the trier of fact as to whether or not 
defendant's actions, under the circumstances present, amounted to 
a concealment. The undisputed facts show the defendant refused 
to provide identification and HIP trial court ecu I '1 cone 1 tide the 
defendant's actions amounted to a concealment. There is nothing 
1 1
 Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-35-26(g)(1982), adopting Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). Interpreted in State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
in the record that would warrant any appellate court in 
overturning the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11-04-100 was violated by the 
defendant when he failed to provide identification at the police 
officer's request. The detention and arrest of the defendant was 
within constitutional standards because the defendant appeared to 
be underage, was in possession of an alcoholic beverage and was 
intoxicated, giving rise to reasonable suspicion for the 
detention and probable cause for the subsequent arrest. 
The Salt Lake Ordinance is not unconstitutionally void 
because its only requirement is that the defendant provide some 
identifying information. It is not in the discretion of the 
officer to determine what identification is required. 
Furthermore, the defendant in refusing to provide identification 
did not place what identification would satisfy the ordinance 
into issue. Therefore, defendant's argument that "identity" as 
used in the ordinance is vague and unenforceable is not at issue 
under the facts of this case. 
DATED this day of August, 1989. 
CHERYL D. LUKE, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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